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A Reply-The Missing Portion
PIERRE SCHLAG*

I wish to thank Michael and Pam Fischl for organizing and hosting
this symposium. I also wish to thank the participants for the care they
have taken in reading my work and the thought they have put into their
responses. It is both an honor and a humbling experience to have so
many thoughtful people comment on one's work.
I have been struggling for some time with a way to respond to the
criticisms, observations, invitations, reproaches, and cajoling offered in
these papers. Not only is it a formidable task because the papers are so
many (and issue from so many different angles) but also because they
often require some real thought and reflection on my part.
Occasionally, I would like to say in response, "No I didn't say that.
And in fact if you would look at page 436, you can see that ... See it
there?" But I've read these kinds of author replies before (so have you)
and let's face it: whether or not they are warranted, they're kind of boring-reminiscent of the "Did so/Did not, Did so/Did not" structure of an
earlier stage of life.
In an effort to push the conversation along (rather than rehearse the
"Did so/Did not" structure), I offer a number of observations, questions,
and ruminations below. Some of these have bite; others are offered in
the spirit of wonder.
THE MISSING PORTION

A good number of papers affirm that there is something missing in
what I have produced. What is missing, however, is rarely the same
thing. But it is always missing and its absence is almost always perceived as a problem. Let's call the missing portion "Z."
Where I differ with my critics is almost never on the question
whether Z is missing. And seldom do I disagree that it might be interesting or helpful for someone to add in Z. Often though, my reaction is:
"Great, why don't you do it?" Sometimes my reaction is less charitable:
"But it's already been done: it's not helpful to do it again. Z, Z, Z - it's
boring. We're just going to sound like machines." Regardless of charity
or lack thereof, where I do disagree is in the sometimes implicit, some* Byron White Professor of Law at the University of Colorado.
For comments and criticisms on earlier drafts, I wish to thank Peter Goodrich, Sarah Krakoff,
Debbie Maranville, Jack Schlegel, and Bert Westbrook.
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times explicit claim that the failure to include someone's favorite Z in
my account compromises what I have done.
I try deliberately to do what other people are not doing. The suggestion in some of the papers that I should do what others are already
doing, or have already done very well, doesn't seem terribly helpful to
me. There are, of course, times when reading the responses that I want
to say to my critics: "You are absolutely right. I didn't do that (write
about the body, the material aspects of reason, critical race theory, the
politics of reason, and more ....). The Enchantment of Reason doesn't
explore those things. It didn't set out to explore those things. And
you're right: it would be very interesting to do so. And in some cases,
maybe The Enchantment of Reason would have been a better book had I
done so ....But I don't see that my failure to do that impeaches what I
have done. So please don't read The Enchantment of Reason in a totalizing spirit (as some sort of standard exhaustive work on reason).' This
is more the sort of thing one attempts to write once the discipline has
broken down (a point I have explored elsewhere and now take as a
given). 2
DISCIPLINARY BREAKDOWN AS OPPORTUNITY

One of the virtues of the disciplinary breakdown in law is that there
really are possibilities for doing any number of different and interesting
things. You don't have to do standard legal scholarship. You don't
have to spend your days "rigorously" tracing out the xylem and phloem
at the ends of your disciplinary tree. You don't have to simulate the
good judgment of the academy (when this good judgment is offensive).
As I see it, part of being an intellectual is having your own projects,
your own intellectual agenda, your own sense of what to do-as
opposed to simply following the default institutional paths laid out for
you. Renouncing those default institutional paths, of course, is no easy
matter.

1.Goodrich's and Kennedy's essays elaborate on the form of The Enchantment of Reason.
See Peter Goodrich, Pierre the Anomalist: An Epistemology of the Legal Closet, 57 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 791 (2003); Duncan Kennedy, Pierre Schlag's The Enchantment of Reason, 57 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 513 (2003).
2. Westbrook's essay deals directly with this theme and struggle. David A. Westbrook,
Pierre Schlag and the Temple of Boredom, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 649 (2003). Hackney provides a
more comforting diagnostic of the state of legal theory-finding hope in the proliferation of
perspectives. James R. Hackney, Jr., The "End" of: Science, Philosophy, and Legal Theory, 57
U. MIAMI L. REV. 629 (2003).
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FALSE EMPOWERMENT

(No. 1)

From the very first day, law school training leads law students to
believe that judicial decisions produce important consequences for the
social order. The presumption is that the words of the judge (if they are
well crafted) will effectively produce a social reality that corresponds
roughly with the words uttered. But what reason is there to believe this? 3
FALSE EMPOWERMENT

(No. 2)

The endlessly repeated question in first year, "What should the
court do?" leads law students to believe that courts respond to the force
of the better argument. This would be tolerable if one added two
provisos:
1. The better argument often means little more than the one the
courts are predisposed to believe; and
2. In the phrase "force of better argument" it's important to attend
not just to the "better" part, but to the other term as well.
FALSE EMPOWERMENT

(No. 3)

Law students first learn of many complex social and economic realities through the medium of case law. What they learn is thus the law's
vision of these economic and social realities. Not surprisingly, there is
an almost magical correspondence between legal categories and social
or economic practices. This magical fit leads law students (later to
become law professors) to have an extremely confident view of the efficacy of law.
Many law students are cured of this belief-structure by a stay in the
legal clinic or by law practice.4 There is one group of people, however,
who are generally not cured of this belief-structure at all, but whose faith
is actually intensified. These are the people who hold prestigious judicial clerkships where an emotional proximity to and identification with
their judge ("my judge") leads to an even greater confidence in the efficacy of law. These people are frequently chosen to teach in law schools.
FALSE EMPOWERMENT

(No. 4)

False empowerment can be disempowering. It can also lead to pessimism and despair.
3. Not much, as Susan Silbey shows. Susan S. Silbey & Patricia Ewick, The Double Life of
Reason and Law, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497 (2003).
4. Phyllis Goldfarb, Picking Up the Law, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973 (2003).
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(No. 1)

Many people react to a loss of faith in law or legal studies with
despair or pessimism. But this is the despair and pessimism that comes
from giving up a naYve or a romantic vision of law and/or legal studies.
The onslaught of this despair and pessimism is a good thing. It is like
the thirty-something who realizes that he is mortal and that life is brief.
Generally, this is not welcome news. At the same time, it may help
prevent a life spent in Heideggerian dread, tanning salons, or the interstices of footnote 357.
PESSIMISM, DESPAIR, ETC.

(No. 2)

When the academic loses faith in law or legal studies, typically that
person is most troubled because she has lost the framework that makes
her academic project possible. But so what? Isn't the demand that law
conform to an academic project arguably a selfish one?
THE CON, THE JOKE, AND THE IRONIC TRUTH

The Con: In the courtroom, the appellate judge is typically seated
behind an elevated bench. On the classroom blackboard the appellate
judge is chalked in above the plaintiff and the defendant. This is both a
reflection and a reinforcement of the belief that the appellate judge is an
intellectually and politically privileged legal actor.
The Joke: In actuality, the appellate judge is a person who operates
in conditions of severe information deficits and whose outlook is thoroughly manipulated by professional rhetoricians. Very often he has little or no understanding of the configurations of the social field to which
his rulings will apply. What's more, this is a person who is prohibited
from talking about the social field, except with a highly restricted number of people.
The Ironic Truth: On the other hand, because we believe the appellate judge is a particularly privileged intellectual and political actor, we
contribute to making him so.

A

CRUEL HOAX

Legal intellectuals like to believe that law is an intelligent enterprise. They like to believe that the law offers an interesting vocabulary,
grammar, and rhetoric through which to think about the world and law
itself. This is naive. The political demand that law be efficacious means
that law must track, must indeed incorporate popular beliefs about social
and economic identities, causation, linguistic meaning, and so forth.
(Those beliefs are often intellectually bereft.)
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THE ARGUMENT ROOM

The argument room is a place where academic advocates go to
argue passionately about law and politics. (Apologies to Monty
Python.) Within the room, arguments are won and lost; triumphs and
defeats are had. But generally, no one outside the room pays much
attention to what goes on inside the room. Sometimes there is seepage
and fragments of the conversations are heard outside the room.
Participants most often spend their time arguing about what should
happen outside the room. This they call "knowledge" or "understanding" or "jurisprudence" or "scholarship" or "politics." The one thing
that generally cannot be talked about inside the room is the construction
of the room itself.
POLITICS

(No. 1)

For progressive legal thinkers, politics is a "theoretical unmentionable": The concept "politics" does a great deal of theoretical work and
yet its identity remains generally immune from scrutiny. The categories
(right, left) and the fundamental grammar of politics (progress, reaction,
and so forth) generally go unquestioned. Oddly, while everything else
seems to be contingent, conditional, contextual, and so on, the categories
of politics seem to be oddly stable, nearly transcendent. Strangely, this
occurs at a time when the categories, left and right (and even politics
itself), seem increasingly fragile and non-referential.
Still, this is an intensely political time-political not in the sense of
significant social contestation (not much of that) nor in the sense of ideological struggle (not happening much either). Rather, political in the
sense of very significant reorganizations and reallocations of power,
wealth, and so on. 5
Capital (for lack of a better term) is in a period of rapid self-reorganization in which it increasingly regiments precincts of life previously
offering some resistance to its grammar-to wit: time, family, media,
public space, wilderness, and so forth. The point is not that these precincts were immune to capital before, but rather that capital is advancing
at such an intense rate to bring about a significant disruption and a qualitative change in these precincts. This change is manifest not only in the
colonization of new precincts, but in the self-organization of capital
5. Hence, the historical contextualization advocated by Judge Davis seems to me entirely
appropriate. The Honorable Dennis M. Davis, Dissonance Orientation: The OccupationalHazard
of Being a Judge or a Requirement for the Job?, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 853 (2003). The kind of
work I have done is not opposed to this contextualization and historicization. Instead, it is a kind
of caution about the ways in which such historicization and contextualization might be
accomplished and what might be expected from such work.
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(new financial vehicles) and, of course, in new literary and intellectual
forms (postmodernism as both symptom and diagnosis).
Meanwhile, the old categories, the old grammar, the old answers,
seem to have lost some of their hold. The right is intellectually stagnant.
And the left is, as a social presence, ontologically challenged. Indeed, in
the United States, we seem at present to have several right wings and no
left wing. This does not mean that "politics" as a social category is
necessarily dead. It might mean simply that we (and others) have not
understood, have not grasped, have not articulated its new
configurations.
What would be required on the intellectual level is a re-evaluation
not only of the conventionally articulated categories, but of the social
and economic ontology. At its best, postmodernism (and there has been
a lot of bad reactionary and nostalgic postmodernism) is an attempt to
trigger such a re-evaluation. Progressives, understandably, strive to protect their categories, grammar, and self-image from these challenges.
But this is not without cost.
POLITICS

(No. 2)

To argue in favor of political positions is sometimes political. But
it is not always political. Sometimes taking up a political argument is
political and sometimes it has no consequences whatsoever. One cannot
know beforehand. But it is a serious mistake to suppose that arguing in
favor of a political position is in and of itself political.
Very often in the legal academy, to argue for a political (or normative) position is not political at all. It simply triggers a scholastic, highly
stereotyped meta-discourse about whether the arguments advanced are
sound, accurate, should be adopted, or the like.
A

PROBLEM FOR THE LEFT

Traditionally, the left has defended the victims of capitalism, imperialism, and racism. Indeed, this is an important part of what it means to
be "on the left." Meanwhile, in the university, scholarly attention
depends upon the production of new exciting ideas and research agendas. This poses a problem for the left: the victims of capitalism, imperialism, and racism remain the same. The political-intellectual defenses
advanced on behalf of victims remain the same. This leads to a certain
sense of weariness and dfjA vu-stereotyped arguments, standard rhetorical moves. A tendency to fight the same old fights. Machines. This
is a problem.
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PROBLEM FOR PROGRESSIVE LEGAL THINKERS

As the author of Laying Down the Law, it just isn't clear to me that
law is the sort of thing that is endlessly perfectible. At times it seems to
me that law is a lot like military strategy. You can try making military
strategy the best it can be (maybe you should). But when you get done
it's still going to be military strategy.
In that context it would be a good thing to have a few people (I
volunteer) to be less than completely enthralled by military strategy.
The same would go for law. It could be that law is objectionable in
important respects because, well... it's law. If you are going to mediate social contradictions through a linguistically normalized system of
organized institutional force (e.g., law) you should not expect the results
to be pretty (no matter how humane or contextual you get along the
way).
LAW AS A WHITE MALE PRODUCTION

It seems worthwhile to have a few people focus on the production
side of law's equations-how is this law produced, what versions of self
does it enact, how does it reproduce itself, how does it achieve rhetorical
supremacy, how does it mediate its various crises, etc. etc. etc.
In my work-the construction of the subject, anti-disciplinarity, the
critique of normativity, the enchantment of reason, the politics of form,
the aesthetics-I have been concerned with these kinds of questions. I
think there is a politics to that-however incomplete, unfinished, elliptical, underdetermined, and open-ended it might be.6
POLITICS AS ARROGANCE

As a legal thinker, I believe in trying to do something that has intellectual, political, or aesthetic value. Any one of the three would be just
great-a real success, something worthy of respect. This is especially
so because, given the institutional paths laid out by the legal academy,
it's pretty easy to strike out.7
6. For discussion, see Goodrich, supra note 1.
7. Rittich's essay lays out alternative kinds of scholarly enterprises one might follow. Kerry
Rittich, Enchantments of Reason/Coercions of Law, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 727 (2003). Farley's

essay is a provocative effort to actually practice a different form of (legal) writing. Anthony Paul
Farley, The Dream of Interpretation, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 685 (2003). Gudridge's essay takes

another tack-finding in the repetitions of law the sources of critique and deviation. Patrick 0.
Gudridge, Mit Schlag (Repetitions), 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 607 (2003). Maria Grahn-Farley's
article on child fights can be seen as an effort to break form. Maria Grahn-Farley, A Theory of
Child Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 867 (2003).
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But if one has a choice, which should one pursue? Perhaps it
depends upon where one thinks one can advance, say, or do something
worthwhile. This will depend upon a person's talents and field as well
as his/her estimation of context and possibilities. From this standpoint it
seems odd that someone should feel authorized to say: "You should do

LEGAL THOUGHT AS ARROGANCE

The belief is that the future of the free world, the maintenance of
the rule of law, the welfare of the republic, the liberation of oppressed
peoples, the direction of the Court, the legitimacy of the Florida election,
hangs on a law professor's next article. This is the esprit serieux gone
nuts. The most significant effect of this belief is to arrest thought and
end the play of ideas necessary for creativity.
SERIOUS AND NOT

(No. 1)

Yes, legal interpretation sometimes takes place in a field of pain
and death.9 But that hardly means that legal studies takes place in a field
of pain and death. It is a residual objectivism that enables legal academics to believe that when they write about law-what it is or what it
should be-they are somehow engaged in the same enterprise as judges.
They're not.
It is not that legal scholarship is without consequence. It's just that
the institutional and rhetorical contexts are sufficiently different that the
consequences are different as well.
SERIOUS AND NOT

(No. 2)

There is an important, indeed foundational, category mistake that
sustains American legal thought-it is the supposition that because academics and judges deploy the same vocabulary and the same grammar,
they are involved in largely the same enterprise. I just don't think that's
true.
8. Maranville puts it this way: "[P]erhaps we should stop trying to find a solution for what
'we' all should do, in the abstract. We have different gifts, and different interests." Deborah
Maranville, Building a Better Sand Castle: Fantasy, Growth, and the Enchantment of Reason, 57
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1007, 1023 (2003). See also Tamara R. Piety, Smoking in Bed, 57 U. MIAMI L.
REV.

827 (2003).
9. It is important to recall the context in which Cover's famous phrase was issued. Cover

was writing in reaction to a scholarly tendency (exemplified in the work of James Boyd White and
Ronald Dworkin) which rather uncritically assumed legal interpretation to be essentially a literary

or philosophical enterprise. Cover's essay is best understood as a corrective to this tendency.
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
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My own view is that legal academics are but one social group
(among many) competing for the articulation of what law is. Judges are
another. Social movements, corporations, public interest groups, administrative officials, criminals, etc., are some of the others. °
For most of the history of the American law school, academics
have anointed judges as privileged speakers of law. In turn, legal academics have adopted the habits, forms of thought, and rhetoric of
judges-thereby accruing to themselves the authority to say what the
law is.
Legal academics legitimate their claim to say what the law is by
fashioning law as an academic discipline requiring expertise. Legal academics then hold themselves out as possessing this expertise.
Among those critical theorists who seek to contest this expertise,
one can distinguish two approaches. One approach is to try to reveal the
emptiness of the claims to expertise among the legal intelligentsia and to
reveal how these claims nonetheless gain power. Another approach is to
try to relocate the authority to say what the law is among those who have
been excluded.
I do not see these approaches as antithetical, but rather as complementary. Furthermore, both approaches will in fact reinscribe, will
performatively reinforce, precisely the sort of rhetorics and hierarchies
they contest. No way around that.
I think critical thinkers all do this-though in different ways. And
it's certainly worthwhile pointing out how it is being done. ' At the
same time, no one is safe or immune from this sort of criticism.
SERIOUS AND NOT

(No. 3)

To learn to laugh at what is taken seriously, but is not serious, is a
serious thing to do. To take seriously what is not, is a drag.

A

PROBLEM FOR PROGRESSIVES

Progressives wish to pursue a politics that is efficacious. This
means keeping track both of the social context in which progressivism
articulates itself (on the side of the subject), and the social context in
10. Silbey's essay elaborates this point concretely and persuasively. See Silbey & Ewick,
supra note 3. It is also articulated in Jack Schlegel's work. John Henry Schlegel, But Pierre,If
We Can't Think Normatively, What Are We to Do?, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 955 (2003).
11. Hence, Joanne Conaghan takes me to task for a failure to address feminist jurisprudence,
and Mariah Grahn-Farley as well as Dariah Roithmayr reproach me for a failure to address critical
race theory. Joanne Conaghan, Schlag in Wonderland, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 543 (2003); Daria
Roithmayr, "Easy for You to Say": An Essay on Outsiders, the Usefulness of Reason, and
Radical Pragmatism, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939 (2003); Maria Grahn-Farley, An Open Letter to
PierreSchlag, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 755 (2003).
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which progressivism seeks to register its results (on the side of the
object). But this work of reconnaissance-a work that is necessarymay bring unwelcome news: namely that progressivism unmodified is
no longer a terribly cogent project. Choices will have to be made: to
defend progressive thought against this unwelcome news or to put the
identity of progressive projects at risk by encountering this unwelcome
news.
FORMALISM (OR PIERRE MENARD'S LAW REVIEw ARTICLE)

Formalism is virtually an inexorable condition of legal scholarship
in the following sense: a legal academic generally writes scholarship
outside the social pressures of what a lawyer would call real stakes, real
clients, or real consequences. The failure of an argument in the pages of
the Stanford Law Review is generally very different from the failure of
an argument in a brief or an opinion. The difference in context changes
the character and consequences of the acts-even if the authors use
exactly the same words.
BINARY AND NOT (INSIDERIOUTSIDER, IMMANENT/TRANSCENDENT,
MIND/BODY ETC. ETC. ETC.)

It's one thing to deploy oppositional binarism to describe the broad
structures of a text. It's quite another to adopt binarism as an intellectual
lifestyle choice.12
Oppositional binarism has a special hold/appeal in American law
precisely because: 1) law is often identified with what appellate courts
say it is; and 2) by the time a case gets to an appellate court, the reductionism of litigation and the binary structure of the adversarial orientation has reduced the dispute to an either/or (e.g., liberty vs. equality or
formal equality vs. substantive equality, and so on).
But ....
Oppositional binarism flounders because law does not have fixed,
uncontroversial grids. Hence, for instance, the notion that a person is an
insider or an outsider just doesn't track with much of anything (except
perhaps the author's own formalism).
If one thinks about it, a person is an insider in this respect (he's
white) but an outsider in that respect (he's working class) and then an
insider with respect to his pedigree (he went to Columbia) but really an
outsider within his insider Columbia status because he was profoundly
12. The essays by Jane Baron and Jeremy Paul make this point much more elaborately. Jane
B. Baron, Romancing the Real, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 573 (2003); Jeremy Paul, Beyond Reason
and Interest, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 593 (2003).
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alienated from the Columbia social scene and blah blah blah. After a
while (very soon, actually) the insider/outsider distinction loses its hold.
The point is, unless you happen to have a well-formed, non-overlapping
fixed grid (and this would be a very strange thing for a critical theorist to
have!), oppositional binarism (like everything else) ultimately collapses.
Interestingly, there was a moment of slippage in the history of critical legal studies (or perhaps the fem-crits) when binary oppositionalism
slid from a heuristic into (of all things) a metaphysic!
THE MACHINES

In Keith Aoki's comic strip, the agents of R.E.A.S.O.N. and
P.I.E.R.R.E. fight each other in a comically clich6d fashion. It is Nick
Fury jurisprudence. And there is something strikingly right about that
(however humbling it may be for me and others).
One of the things that happens in the Nick Fury comic strips (as in
Keith Aoki's contribution) is that the antagonists deploy machines
against each other. In legal thought, we have a lot of machines in operation.1 3 By this I mean that a great deal of so-called legal thought is not
really thought at all-but the deployment of a series of rhetorical operations over and over again to perform actions (usually destructive in character) on other peoples' texts or persons. Every argument tends to
become a machine. Over time, legal academics tend to become their
own arguments. Then, of course, they become their own machines. At
that point, it's time to move on. This is why there is hope.
CODA

There are real advantages to working within an academic field
whose disciplinary structures have disintegrated. The gift is that you
really can study, think about, and pursue almost anything you think is
interesting, salient, or politically helpful. The trick is not to waste the
opportunity.

13. The essays by Jeanne Schroeder and David Carlson as well as Fran Olsen are exemplary
instances of this mechanical subsumption of one text to another. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David
Gray Carlson, Law's Non-Existent Empire, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767 (2003); Frances Olsen,
Peace, Civil Disobedience, and Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Appraisal of Reason and
Politics, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 989 (2003).

